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WHERE'S THE BEEF? FACILITATING
VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT OF FEDERAL
LANDS FROM LIVESTOCK GRAZING
JOHN D.LESHY & MOLLY S. MCUSlC*
INTRODUCTION
Acre for acre, grazing of domestic livestock is the most
widespread extractive use of the federal lands. It takes place on
well over one quarter of a billion acres-almost ten times the size
of Pennsylvania. These lands are nearly all in the eleven western
states. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department
of the Interior manages about 258 million of these acres, about 90
percent of BLM lands in the lower 48 states. The U.S. Forest
Service (USFS) in the Department of Agriculture manages
approximately 100 million acres, or about 60 percent of national
forest lands in the lower 48.1 Some 20,000 livestock operators
(hereafter, ranchers) use these federal lands: BLM has issued about
18,000 permits and USFS about 7,000; several thousand ranchers
have both. Collectively, these permits authorize a maximum use
of about 22 million "animal unit -months" (AUMs) of forage
" The authors were fortunate to have excellent research assistance from Eric
Ritter of Harvard Law School and Laurie Mikkelson of UC Hastings College of
the Law, and appreciate the careful review and helpful comments of John
Echeverria (who, it should be said, disagrees with our recommendation), and of
Professors Schoenbrod, Stewart, and Wyman and the students of the NYU Law
School Environmental Governance workshop when an early version was
presented to them in November 2007. Errors and other shortcomings are the sole
responsibility of the authors. Comments may be sent to leshyj@uchastings.edu.
' BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, FACT SHEET ON THE BLM's
MANAGEMENT OF LIVESTOCK GRAZING, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/
grazing.l.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2008); U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS Table 1-3 (2007), available
at http://www.blm.gov/public landstatistics/pls07/pls 1 -3_07.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERV. RANGE MGMT., GRAZING STATISTICAL SUMMARY
iii (2005), http://www.fs.fed.us/rangelands/ftp/docs/graz stat summary_2005.pdf;
see also infra notes 7, 32, and accompanying text (livestock grazing is also
permitted in some units of the national wildlife refuge and national park
systems).
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harvesting.2
Despite the vast acreage, the meat produced from public land
forage is a tiny fraction (about 2 percent) of national meat
production, and provides few jobs or economic activity in the
region.3 But the ecological costs are "profound," even though it
"often takes a trained eye to comprehend damage to rangeland"
because the ecological harm "is so pervasive and has existed for so
long that it frequently goes unnoticed."4 Livestock congregate in
riparian areas, which are the most productive habitats for flora and
fauna in the arid West, where the "ecological stakes are highest.",
5
This magnifies their adverse impacts, and is a primary reason
livestock grazing affects nearly twice as many imperiled species as
6
either logging or mining. Climate change is expected to
exacerbate these impacts.7
For many decades conservationists have sought to ameliorate
these impacts by curtailing or, in cases of the most severe damage
eliminating, livestock grazing by tougher federal regulation. Their
efforts have been marked more by failure than success. One
measure is this: Livestock grazing continues on millions of acres
2 An AUM is the amount of forage eaten by one cow, or five sheep or goats,
grazing for one month--or about 750-800 pounds of grass.
3 See generally DEBRA DONAHUE, THE WESTERN RANGE REVISITED 250-63
(1999); SONORAN INSTITUTE, PROSPERITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
WEST: THE ROLE OF PROTECTED PUBLIC LANDS (2004), available at
http://sonoran.org/index.php?option=comdocman&task=docdownload&gid=6
6&Itemi-d=74.
4 Thomas L. Fleischner, Ecological Costs of Livestock Grazing in Western
North America, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 629, 629-30 (1994). Land in the
lower 48 that has never been grazed by domestic livestock is, Fleischner notes,
"extremely rare." This makes it hard to gauge the environmental effects of
grazing, and Fleischner argues that studies of lands where livestock have been
excluded in recent years "probably underestimate[s]" grazing's impacts because
it does not reveal the "most drastic damage" that occurred many decades ago
when domestic livestock, often very large herds of omnivorous sheep, were first
introduced. Id. at 630; see also Jason C. Neff et al., Increasing Eolian Dust
Deposition in the Western United States Linked to Human Activity, I NATURE
GEOSCIENCE 189, 189, tbl. 1 (2008) (citing an intriguing recent study of sediment
deposition in alpine lakes in southwestern Colorado showed a 500 percent
increase in dust, persisting to the present, that began around the time that massive
numbers of livestock were introduced in the arid west toward the end of the
nineteenth century).
5 Fleischer, supra note 4; see also NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, RIPARIAN AREAS:
FUNCTIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR MANAGEMENT (2002).
6 David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the
United States, 48 BIOSCIENCE 607, 610 (1998).7 Id. at 613-14.
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of federal land that have been given protective designations like
national conservation areas, monuments, and wildlife refuges.
This is the result of special legislative exemption and compliant
land managers. Even in many congressionally designated
"wilderness" areas-the most protective federal category, designed
to preserve "natural conditions" in areas "untrammeled by man"--
livestock grazing is not only tolerated, but can be expanded as well
as protected by government-sponsored extermination of wild
predators. 8
Over the last decade or so, a promising non-regulatory
solution to the continued wrangling between federal lands ranchers
and conservationists has emerged. It involves conservation-
minded purchasers acquiring federal land grazing permits from
willing sellers, and then offering to relinquish the permits to the
government if it will retire the federal lands from livestock
grazing.
These marketplace-based "purchases and retirements" may
achieve tangible environmental improvements in a shorter time by
less contentious means than pitched battles over regulation. They
can help restore the health of grasslands, riparian areas, water
quality, and wildlife populations. They can make it easier for
government land managers to cope with drought, fire, and insect
outbreaks, and to combat the invasions of exotic species. They can
help sequester carbon from the atmosphere. They can save the
government money, because federal land livestock grazing
generally costs considerably more-in managing the permits and
the land, conducting predator control and other supportive
activities, and dealing with the environmental damage-than any
measurable benefit derived from it.9 Buyouts can also improve the
8 See generally Mitchel P. McClaran, Livestock in Wilderness: A Review and
Forecast, 20 ENVTL. L. 857, 859, 887, n.15 (1990) (stating that about half of the
congressionally-designated wilderness areas in the national forests have some
livestock use and the proportion is probably substantially higher in BLM-managed
wilderness areas). See also Forest Guardians v. Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Serv., 309 F.3d 1141, 1141 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding a federal
program to kill mountain lions in a congressionally-designated wilderness area in
order to protect livestock grazing, even though the program was instituted after the
area was designated wilderness).
9 Robert H. Nelson, How to Reform Grazing Policy: Creating Forage
Rights on Federal Rangelands, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 645, 653, 656-67 (1997)
(examining the reason economists have advocated grazing buyouts since the
1950s); Mark Salvo & Andy Kerr, The National Public Lands Grazing
Campaign, 11 WILD EARTH 83, 83 (2001-2002); NATIONAL PUBLIC LAND
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political climate for other conservation measures on the federal
lands because ranchers-whose political influence far exceeds
their numbers and economic impact-have tended to strongly
oppose such measures.10
These buyouts often make sense for the ranchers themselves.
The globalization of the beef market has put the economic return
from western federal-land-based livestock grazing operations
below those of almost all other investments. 1 Sometimes, in fact,
federal grazing allotments with high biological or recreational
value are the most marginal and troublesome to manage for
livestock. Ranchers may find it simpler to cash out of such
allotments, either to retire from ranching altogether or to
reorganize their operations around less highly contested pastures.
It is the premise of this paper that-because it has the
potential to resolve vexing conflicts of resources and values, and to
restore environmental health to millions of acres of federal land-
conservation-minded acquisitions of grazing permits could be
greatly expanded, except for one major problem: On most lands
managed by the BLM and USFS, those wishing to commit funds to
such acquisitions have no assurance that the federal lands
associated with the purchased grazing permits will be permanently
retired from grazing. Indeed, under current law and policy, there is
a serious risk that, if the conservation buyer relinquishes the
permits, the federal land manager may allow other ranchers to
GRAZING CAMPAIGN, http://www.publiclandsranching.org (last visited Sept. 21,
2008).
10 There are exceptions. Conservationists have sometimes formed alliances
with ranchers on efforts to fight development of minerals like coal, oil, and gas,
and coalbed methane, and sometimes to curtail off-road vehicle use. But the two
camps tend to remain at loggerheads on protecting things like endangered
species, wolves and other. livestock predators, water quality, and wildlife habitat.
"1 See E. Tom Bartlett et al., Valuing Grazing Use on Public Land, 55 J.
RANGE MGMT. 426 (2002). Today, about half of federal land ranchers get most
of their income elsewhere. Bradley J. Gentner & John A. Tanaka, Classifying
Federal Public Land Grazing Permittees, 55 J. RANGE MGMT. 2, 8 (2002). Some
of these are so-called "amenity ranchers" or hobbyists. They are not always
conservation-minded. Some may be more interested in enhancing big game and
sport fishery habitat (perhaps even stocking with non-native species) and limiting
public access. Only a very small percentage of federal grazing permits and
associated ranchland is bought by nonprofit conservation groups with a
thoroughgoing conservation commitment. See WILLIAM R. TRAVIS ET AL.,
RANCHLAND DYNAMICS IN THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM 13-15
(2002), available at http://www.centerwest.org/futures/ranchlands/
ranchland_dynamicsgye.pdf
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expand their operations by putting their livestock on these federal
lands. To avoid this result, conservation buyers may find
themselves being required, against their better judgment, to buy
livestock and negotiate with federal land managers over how few
animals may be grazed without running the risk of losing their
grazing privileges for "non-use."
The following addresses this problem in some detail, offers a
simple statutory solution, compares this solution to alternatives,
and explores the politics of securing its adoption by Congress.
I. How WE GOT To THIS POINT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL
LANDS GRAZNG
For a long time, the official U.S. policy toward livestock
grazing on federal lands was silence. It was not until the depths of
the Great Depression in 1934 that Congress first addressed the
subject for the largest category of federal lands-that managed by
the BLM.12 Before that, these lands were treated as a commons,
open to all comers. And come the livestock operators did, literally
in droves, flooding the lands with millions of head of cattle and
sheep beginning in the 1880s. The courts in this era filled the
vacuum left by congressional inaction by regarding the ranchers as
having an implied and revocable license from the government to
run their herds on the public lands.'
3
The government's acquiescence in this use of federal land
forage gave rise to a classic "tragedy of the commons," 14 where
each operator's self-interest was to run as many head as possible
on the "free" range before somebody else did. The consequence
was predictable: In the most arid parts of the West, entire
ecosystems were, within the span of a few short years toward the
12 See infra note 18 and accompanying text (grazing on the national forests
came under minimal federal regulation in the early twentieth century).13 The highwater mark of the implied license was Buford, where, according
to the Supreme Court, it gave nomadic sheepherders the privilege of crossing
private lands of other ranchers (foraging the private grass along the way) in order
to gain access to the public lands. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 325 (1890).
Otherwise, the Court reasoned, these other ranchers, who were successors to a
railroad land grant and owned 350,000 acres interspersed among more than
600,000 acres of public land in northern Utah, would be able to monopolize
grazing on the public lands, thwarting the sheepherders' implied, equivalent
license to use those lands. Id. at 327.
14 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)
(using overgrazing as the paradigm case in his classic article).
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
[Volume 17
HeinOnline  -- 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 372 2008-2009
WHERE'S THE BEEF?
end of the nineteenth century, degraded and permanently
transformed. Environmental historian Donald Worster has likened
the "invasion" by millions of introduced forage animals in that era
to the "explosive, shattering effect of all-out war."'15 Phillip Foss
put it this way in his landmark 1960 study: "Overgrazing caused
millions of acres of grassland to become desert. Lands which
produced native grasses 'up to your stirrups' within the lifetime of
persons now living became, and remain today, virtual deserts."' 6
Drastic declines in forage, coupled with some particularly harsh
winters in the north in the mid-1880s, and with drought in the
southwest in 1893, led to a near-collapse of the industry.' 7 But it
retrenched, and unrestricted grazing continued as much as the
abused land would permit. Some (particularly nomadic
sheepherders) remained constantly on the move with their flocks.
But more and more ranchers, especially those running cattle,
obtained fee title to small tracts of federal land, usually along
streams, under disposal laws like the Homestead Act, to take
advantage of the forage on federal lands in the vicinity. This
created the situation commonly found today, where a single ranch
may own a few dozen or a few hundred acres in fee, but have
permits to use many thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of
acres of federal lands.
Beginning in the early 1890s, millions of acres of the open-to-
all federal lands of the so-called "public domain" were designated
as "forest reserves" (the original name for the national forests).
After Congress gave the executive authority to regulate their
"occupancy and use" in 1897,18 the new U.S. Forest Service took
some halting steps to bring ranchers on these lands under modest
supervision, requiring-them to obtain a permit and pay a token fee,
and even in some cases to limit overgrazing. 19 Grazing on the
15 DONALD WORSTER, UNDER WESTERN SKIES: NATURE AND HISTORY IN THE
AMERICAN WEST 45 (1992).
16 PHILLIP Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING ON
THE PUBLIc DOMAIN 4 (1960).
'7 See FREDERICK MERK, HISTORY OF THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT 463
(1978). See also Worster, supra note 15, at 42 (describing it as one of the
greatest losses of animal life in the history of pastoralism). Future President
Theodore Roosevelt's ranch in the badlands of South Dakota suffered this fate in
the terrible winter of 1886-87. EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE OF THEODORE
ROOSEVELT 364-67 (1979).
" 16 U.S.C. §§ 478, 551 (2000) (failing to mention grazing).
19 See generally WILLIAM D. ROWLEY, U.S. FOREST SERVICE GRAZING AND
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much larger expanse of federal lands outside the forest reserves,
however, remained free and unregulated for several more decades.
As the 1920s drew to a close, overgrazing combined with
drought and agricultural depression brought conditions on the
public grazing lands outside the national forests to a state of crisis.
By this time many public lands ranchers (as well as their
longstanding champion in Congress, Edward Taylor of Colorado)
were reluctantly concluding that something had to be done to
address deteriorating rangelands (by then in Dust Bowl conditions)
as well as conflicts among graziers. The result was the Taylor
Grazing Act (TGA), signed into law by Franklin Roosevelt in
1934.2o
The TGA ended the tradition of free uncontrolled grazing and
substituted a new regimen of permits and fees to allocate the
public forage. At the same time, it reaffirmed that ranchers had
only a revocable license to use the public lands, for it provided that
public land grazing permits "shall not create any right, title,
interest, or estate in or to the lands.",21 Despite this disclaimer,
federal grazing permits (on USFS as well as BLM lands) have long
been bought and sold among ranchers, with federal approval, and
are ordinarily included in the value of the ranch on the open
market.22 Banks loan money against the permits, and federal
capital gains and estate tax calculations reflect the value the
permits have in the marketplace. This paradox-that federal land
grazing permits are legally merely revocable licenses, not
compensable property rights, yet nevertheless command
substantial value in the private marketplace-has led many
ranchers to keep a particularly tenacious grip on public rangelands.
Despite the fact that the TGA was enacted to restore health to
public rangelands, it did little to achieve this goal. Ranchers long
accustomed to the open, bureaucracy-free grazing commons-
even those who welcomed its demise--did not appreciate
RANGELANDS: A HISTORY 40 (1985). These steps were unsuccessfully
challenged by the ranchers in court; see United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506
(1911); see also Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
20 See 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2000). See generally E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE
CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 214-24 (1951).
21 43 U.S.C. § 315b (2000).
22 Foss, supra note 16, at 197; see also L. Allen Torell & Marc E. Kincaid,
Public Land Policy and the Market Value of New Mexico Ranches, 1979-1994,
49 J. RANGE MGMT. 270, 270 (1996).
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government interference. The result was cautious if not downright
timid implementation. Federal officials often tended to act more
as agents for the ranching industry than as regulators of it, and
Stockmen's Advisory Boards dominated the administration of
federal grazing lands for decades.23 To ameliorate the effect on the
ranchers of ending the commons, the new federal permits over-
allocated the forage resource. Ferry Carpenter, a Harvard-trained
lawyer who was the first director of the federal Grazing Service,
could not have been more candid: As he put it, the choice Was
between moving faster and "hammer[ing] the heads of the
operators unmercifully[, or going slower and] continu[ing] to
hammer the public domain. Well, as the public domain range is
less articulate than the stockmen, we have chosen to hammer the
public domain.,2 4 In 1946 the federal Grazing Service was merged
with the old General Land Office to create the Bureau of Land
Management, just in time for Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada to
lead a five-year effort to starve it into submission.25 The episode,
and others like it, helped keep federal land managers cowed on the
subject of grazing.
A quarter-century later, when federal rangeland conditions
had not much improved, Congress adopted a spate of
environmentally-oriented laws that seemed to brighten the
prospect for making federal rangelands healthier. The fledgling
modem environmental movement seized on one of these, the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), in the early 1970s as
the best hope of improving conditions on BLM lands. Initially it
won a major victory in court,26 which led BLM to prepare, over
23 The federal officials did have to address conflicts between those running
sheep and those running cattle. To some extent this posed the issue whether to
favor those with earlier use (which tended to be nomadic sheepherders) or those
who came later but often owned homesteaded land near the public range
(cattlegrowers). Ultimately the Interior Department created a preference system
that worked to favor cattle ranchers and disadvantage those who did not own
"base property" or fee land in the vicinity of the public lands. Earlier, the USFS
had reached a similar resolution, tending to allocate forage in favor of those who
lived or maintained ranches within or in the "immediate vicinity" of the forest
reserve. See generally LEIGH RAYMOND, PRIVATE RIGHTS IN PUBLIC RESOURCES
115-17 (2003).
24 RAYMOND, supra note 23, at 216, n.93 (quoting transcript of statewide
meeting in Oregon, Dec. 15, 1934).
25 PEFFER, supra note 20, at 247.
26 NRDC v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'dper curiam, 527
F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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more than a decade, dozens of environmental impact statements on
its grazing program. These documented what was known all
along; namely, overgrazing kept many public lands in unhealthy
condition, and to improve matters the number of grazing animals
had to be reduced or in some areas eliminated altogether. But
NEPA requires only disclosure, not results. Conservation interests
also attempted to use other new laws like the Clean Water Act, the
Endangered Species Act, the Wild & Scenic Rivers Act, and the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). While these
efforts occasionally met with some (albeit limited) success, 27
generally the courts were not very hospitable to the idea of
becoming, as one federal judge put it, the "rangemaster" for
hundreds of millions of acres of federal lands.28
While not notably successful, the conservationists' campaign
did spark a counter-movement. In the late 1970s ranchers on
federal lands spearheaded the so-called "Sagebrush Rebellion,"
which persuaded several western states to pass laws laying claim
to ownership of the federal lands. (Conservationists called it the
"Great Terrain Robbery.") In 1980 presidential candidate Ronald
Reagan declared himself a sagebrush rebel and once in office,
made a half-hearted attempt to sell millions of acres of federal land
(mostly rangeland) in the early 1980s, but the idea provoked
widespread opposition and quickly foundered.29
The net result of all this activity over the past four decades
has been a kind of uneasy stalemate. While there has been some
decline in grazing levels,3 ° the vast majority of federal lands
27 The grazing provisions of FLPMA, enacted in 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1751-
1753 (2000), and the Public Rangelands Improvement Act, enacted in 1978, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1901-08 (2000), both rested on a congressional determination that the
rangelands remained in unhealthy condition and should be improved, but neither
made major changes in the governing legal standards. See GEORGE C. COGGINS,
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT L.FISCHMAN, FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 319-28, 792-93, 798, 806-30, 1101-09 (6th
ed., 2007).
28 NRDC v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1048 (D. Nev. 1985), aff'd 819 F.2d
927 (9th Cir. 1987).
29 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 27, at 77, 450-51. Twenty years later,
ranchers in a few rural western counties led a similar protest, this time dubbed
the "County Supremacy" movement, but-in a stark reflection of the changing
politics of the West-no western state government supported (and several
actively opposed) the movement. Id. at 76-77.
30 "Permitted" AUMS (in BLM-speak, the total amount of allowable grazing
specified in federal grazing permits) declined about a third of 1 percent per year
from 1962 to 2005. "Authorized" AUMs (the number of livestock actually
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
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remain devoted to livestock grazing, and many are still in
ecologically unhealthy condition.
II. EFFORTS AT GRAZING REFORM
Advocates of federal policy reform to improve this situation
have tended to fall into two predictable camps: more privatization,
or more regulation.
A. Privatization
Using the market rather than regulation to address the
problem has long been the solution favored by conservative
commentators and by some ranchers. The strongest version is to
expand the homesteading idea under which many ranchers first
acquired their "base property," to give them fee title to the federal
lands they graze. 3 1 Once privatized, the argument goes, land use
would respond purely to market forces. Ranchers would graze
their land at the optimal level because they would bear the full cost
of not doing so. If condominiums are a more efficient use of the
land, the individual rancher would more likely respond to this
market signal than the government.
But federal grazing lands are today used by many different
interests for many purposes. Ranchers, once their primary user,
now must share the terrain with the likes of hunters, anglers,
hikers, skiers, off-road vehicle enthusiasts and oil, gas, mining,
logging and utility companies. This makes privatization more
complicated both from a political and an efficiency perspective.
Although long the official goal of national policy,
allowed on the public lands by BLM in that year, a number which is usually less
than "permitted" AUMs because lack of precipitation may restrict forage in some
places) declined about 1 percent per year in that same period. These statistics are
compiled from BLM's annual Public Lands Statistics, 1962-2005. BUREAU OF
LAND MANAGEMENT, BLM PUBLICATIONS, www.blm.gov/publications (last
visited Oct. 10, 2008). See also Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728,
736-37 (2000) (suggesting active grazing on the public range declined from
eighteen million to ten million AUMs between 1953 and 1998). It is not easy to
determine whether such statistics accurately reflect uses on the ground, for
BLM's statistics may not be entirely reliable for a variety of reasons. See
generally DONAHUE, supra note 3, at 250-63 (1999). Moreover, it is impossible
to say how much any decline can be attributed to regulation as opposed to
economic conditions or other factors.
31 See, e.g., GARY D. LIBECAP, LOCKING UP THE RANGE: FEDERAL LAND
CONTROLS AND GRAZING (1981); TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE
MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 37-50, 61-79 (1991).
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privatization of what are now the national forests was effectively
rejected by Congress and the President around the turn of the
twentieth century. Privatization of BLM-managed lands was
effectively rejected by Congress and the President in the 1930s,
when the Taylor Grazing Act was passed and the remaining public
domain withdrawn from most further disposal by President
Franklin Roosevelt. 32 Time has made the idea even less plausible
to the American public and its elected officials. In the last quarter
century, proposals to sell off a significant portion of federal lands
around the West have been met with a resounding resistance from
a wide range of interests and quickly died.33
Even if privatization were politically feasible, the multiple use
services derived from the federal lands call into question efficiency
gains forecast by privatization advocates. Formidable legal and
institutional barriers prevent ranchers from collecting rents from
all the beneficiaries of services (like watershed protection, flood
control, and wildlife habitat) those lands provide, and make it
impossible to calibrate the efficient amount of grazing relative to
other uses.34 Without a market mechanism to ascertain the highest
32 See generally PEFFER, supra note 20, at 214-24. This was shortly after the
western states rejected President Hoover's proposal to give them outright title
(minus mineral rights) to these lands. Id. at 203-13.
33 The proposal by the Reagan Administration has already been mentioned.
See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 27, at 76-77. In 2005, the effort by
Congressmen Richard Pombo (R-CA) and Jim Gibbons (R-NV) to reform the
Mining Law in a way that could have privatized millions of acres of federal lands
actually passed the House before dying a quick death in the Senate. See, e.g.,
Kirk Johnson & Felicity Barringer, Bill Authorizes Private Purchase of Federal
Land, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005, at 1. In 2006 the George W. Bush
Administration proposed to sell some federal lands to support public schools in
areas of timber industry decline. See, e.g., Cicero A. Estrella, Sale of Public
Lands Proposed White House Hopes to Replace Funds Lost to Logging
Cutbacks, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Feb. 11, 2006, at A.4. All these
proposals sought in part to raise revenue for various purposes, unlike the
proposal in supra note 31, simply to give the federal land to ranchers. As noted
earlier, grazing also takes place in many wilderness areas and in some national
parks and wildlife refuges, none of which the public has any intention of selling.
34 See B. Delworth Gardner, A Proposal to Reduce Misallocation of
Livestock Grazing Permits, 45 J. OF FARM ECON. 109, 114 (Feb. 1963) ("Due to
the nature of the services and the problems of collecting rentals from the
beneficiaries in the present legal and institutional setting, an efficient solution
would be difficult and probably impossible."); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION 5-65, 159-67 (rev. ed. 1971). On ecological services
generally, see NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL
ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen Daily ed., 1997); Symposium on Ecological Services, 20
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 308-536 (2001).
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and best uses of these lands, it is unclear how privatization will
allow the rancher-owner to choose the most efficient ones.35
Some privatization supporters, implicitly acknowledging that
giving fee ownership to ranchers is neither politically nor
economically viable, have advocated giving them a narrower
property right, just to the forage on the land, with the other
resources and values remaining in public ownership. 36 They argue
the federal government would save at least the estimated $100
million it spends every year managing its grazing program. 7 But
this approach fails to solve the difficulties just described. Not just
the land but the forage itself is subject to multiple use; that is,
optimizing grazing for livestock gives short shrift to wildlife.
Moreover, rural and urban interests downstream benefit from a
healthy vegetative cover that protects water quality, reducing
treatment costs and lengthening the life of reservoirs. There are
significant, probably insurmountable transaction costs in
organizing all the hunters and hikers and bird watchers and farmers
and city dwellers and whoever else would desire to "use" the
forage into a single entity that could offer to buy it from the
rancher/owner. Even if they did somehow manage to solve this
problem and make an offer, the price they would pay would not
accurately reflect the optimal forage value because of the
significant transaction costs the buyer group would have to bear.
This problem of multiple use might be solved if the rancher's
property right was only to a portion of the forage, leaving the rest
for other uses such as wildlife and watershed protection.38 But this
approach merely replaces one regulatory regime with another,
without solving the underlying problem. The government (or
somebody on its behalf) would still have to calculate each year
how much forage should be available to the rancher and how much
is needed for these other purposes. If the federal government is
35 See Gardner, supra note 34, at 114.
36 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 9, at 671-72 (describing advocates for
privatizing forage rights in ranchers).
37 The government recovers only a small fraction of this through the small
fee it charges for each AUM made available. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, LIVESTOCK GRAZING: FEDERAL EXPENDITURES AND RECEIPTS VARY,
DEPENDING ON THE AGENCY AND THE PURPOSE OF THE FEE CHARGED 6 (2005).
38 Cf Nelson, supra note 9, at 681-83. Nelson suggests that some communal
body with an undetermined but seemingly complicated system for selecting its
representatives would determine the amount of grazing needed for non-ranching
purposes each year.
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currently incapable of limiting livestock grazing to an appropriate
amount of forage each year, as the condition of some federal
rangelands indicates, it is not clear how this idea would produce a
different result.
39
Beyond these somewhat technical concerns lies a more
fundamental issue. As far as grazing on federal land is concerned,
privatization is the problem, not the solution. The ranchers have,
predictably, taken the resource effectively "sold" to them through
grazing permits, and used it efficiently without taking much into
consideration their external costs to other users. There is, as noted
earlier, almost no surer tenure of ownership in the entire system of
federal law than a grazing permit. Practically everyone-from the
ranchers to their bankers to the BLM-treats it as essentially a
permanent entitlement. 40  Public lands forage is, in other words,
already effectively privatized. If ranchers limit grazing and bring
back the grass on their public land allotments, it is theirs, and their
children's, to reap in future years. As a result, privatizing the
rangelands will not lead to healthy ecosystems because the amount
of grazing that is optimum for maximizing the economic return
from livestock is not the same amount that is optimum for a
healthy landscape in parts of the arid west.
B. Regulation
At the other end of the spectrum are those who advocate a
more vigorous and effective regulatory approach.41 They believe
that a more environmentally sensitive Executive Branch could use
its ample legal authority to control livestock grazing better, and
curtail at least those operations which cause the most ecological
harm. Indeed, in theory stronger enforcement could, considering
39 What would be different is that the market for selling the forage right
would be larger than it is now, because no longer would the stock owner be the
only one competing to buy. As we will explain below, this can make a
significant diffeience, but the advantage can be gained much more expeditiously
without a new, complicated right to forage.
40 About the only way to lose a permit is to engage in some egregious
scofflaw conduct over a long period of time, and even then the legal machinery
moves very slowly. See, e.g., Klump v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 268, 269
(2001), af'd, 30 Fed. App'x. 958 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v.
United States, 168 F.3d 1209, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999); Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc.
v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397, 1397 (10th Cir. 1976).
41 See, e.g., Todd Oppenheimer, The Rancher Subsidy, The Atlantic Monthly,
Jan. 1996, at 38.
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the poor economics that characterize much ecologically destructive
grazing, eliminate livestock grazing from many degraded federal
lands. While the process would involve some expense, it likely
would save the government money in the long run.
These arguments are not without merit. But the biggest
problem with the argument for more regulation is that it represents,
to borrow Samuel Johnson's famous description of a second
marriage, the triumph of hope over experience. More than a
century of regulatory history (for the USFS, and seventy-five years
for the BLM) reveals how deeply sympathy for ranchers is
embedded in agency culture-a classic case of regulatory agency
"capture. ' 42 Local ranchers press agency personnel, who respond
predictably. Even if conditions on the 'public lands are seen as
intolerable, federal land managers tend to tighten regulation only
after years of monitoring, and in sedulous consultation with the
rancher. They know that, if they show unaccustomed vigor,
ranchers can call on Members of Congress and. other political
actors to intervene-43 And even if the federal land managers limit
the amount of grazing on particular tracts of federal land, history
shows that they are extremely unlikely to retire tracts of federal
lands permanently from livestock grazing altogether.44  Yet
42 BLM's current policy shows clearly how the agency is culture-bound to
view any acre of federal land not grazed as wasted. It finds grazing permit
"relinquishments" are "an increasing concern," because there is "some
expectation" that the lands will be "devoted to uses other than livestock grazing."
It emphasizes that grazing retirements are "not suited for resolving" ecological
degradation, and that retirements should only be done when BLM can determine
that "there are no feasible and practicable solutions readily available that can
resolve livestock grazing issues in a timely manner." Finally, it underscores that,
even if an area is retired, BLM remains free to allow "livestock use to resume on
the subject area." See Memorandum, Bureau of Land Management, Instruction
Memorandum No. 2007-067 (Feb. 20, 2007). On agency capture more
generally, see, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public
Lands: Why "Multiple Use" Failed, 18 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 405, 407 (1994);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275 (1988).
43 A recent example is congressional direction that expiring grazing permits
be renewed notwithstanding the failure of federal land managers to complete
NEPA compliance. E.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447,
§ 339, 118 Stat. 3103,(2004); Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-108, § 325, 117 Stat. 1307, .1307 (2003);
Great Old Broads for Wilderness v. Kempthorne, 452 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C.
2006).
44 Advocates of greater regulation are, as noted earlier, -unlikely to achieve
this result in the courts either. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. The
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because vegetation is slow to respond and soils slow to rebuild in
the more arid parts of the West, nothing short of permanent
removal may allow that land to begin to regain health.45
C. A Market/Regulatory Hybrid
Some conservation organizations have occasionally tried a
third approach. They have bought federal grazing permits from
willing seller ranchers, and then sought approval from the federal
land agencies to eliminate livestock grazing on the federal lands
covered by the permits. This approach effectively changes forage
use from livestock production to wildlife, watershed protection,
grassland restoration, and other ecological purposes.4 6
On a willing buyer-willing seller basis, this "conservation-
purchase-and-retirement" approach combines privatization and
regulation. Like privatization, it brings the competitive workings
of the marketplace to bear, at least in part, to determine whether
the best use is ranching or conservation.
Meanwhile the federal government would maintain its
regulatory program for the federal lands that remain subject to
livestock grazing. This may enhance the prospect that
conservation-oriented buyouts can occur in areas of greatest
exception that proves the rule is the Comb Wash case, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v.
BLM, 140 I.B.L.A. 85, 104 (1997), a practically unique case where the Interior
Board of Land Appeals held that BLM had not, on the record before it, justified
its decision to allow continued grazing on a tract of federal land despite much
evidence of resource damage. Although BLM could have attempted such a
justification and probably been given significant deference had it done so, it
decided instead to order 350 cows removed from 7000 acres of federal land. See
also discussion infra note 51.
45 One range scientist estimated that grazing would need to be eliminated
from only 10 percent of the federal rangeland to restore the-riparian habitats.
Jerry L. Holechek, Policy Changes on Federal Rangelands: A Perspective, 48 J.
SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION 166 (1993). Of course, this likely requires
eliminating substantially more than 10 percent of the livestock because riparian
areas are much more productive of forage.
46 These kinds of acquisitions are possible even though the permits are
simply "privileges" and contain no "rights" because, as noted earlier, federal
grazing permits are marketable. See supra text accompanying note 23. Permits
under the TGA can only be granted to "settlers, residents and other stock
owners." 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2000) (emphasis added). The Grand Canyon
Trust, a regional conservation group which has made buyouts, met this
requirement by forming a livestock-owning subsidiary to hold the permits. This
contortion would not be necessary under our proposal, discussed below, because
conservation interests could simply pay the rancher to relinquish the TGA permit
directly to the government for retirement.
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environmental damage. Federal land managers may be most
willing to regulate to reduce grazing levels in such areas,
furnishing ranchers in those areas with an incentive to sell. The
government can also enhance the efficiency of conservation-
oriented buyouts by engineering trades in appropriate
circumstances. That is, if a rancher is willing to sell to a
conservation-oriented buyer a permit that includes relatively
healthy rangeland, the federal land manager can sometimes
persuade another rancher in the vicinity who is grazing more
damaged land to shift her livestock off that impaired land
(allowing its restoration) to public land covered by the permits
purchased by the conservation buyer.
In addition to attaining a solution-no grazing-that would be
nearly impossible to achieve with regulation alone, the buyout
serves a important distributional purpose. It protects the rancher's
economic interest in a time of economic transition in the rural
West. Capitalizing the subsidy to the rancher into a one-time
payment, the buyout is consistent with longstanding federal policy
of not seeking to maximize economic return to the Treasury from
the use of federal lands, but rather to serve other objectives. 7
Purchase and retirement of grazing permits have, however,
been rare--discouraged by two problems: lack of permanence, and
opposition by locals and by rancher trade associations.
III. LACK OF PERMANENCE
The Secretary of the Interior48 has wide authority and a
number of different ways to retire permits. Each is, however,
discretionary and quite readily reversible, as follows:
1. The Secretary can merely accept the permittee's offer to
relinquish an existing grazing permit, and refuse to entertain
the issuance of any new grazing permit to a neighboring
rancher. Ordinarily this requires little process and
paperwork. But the decision not to issue new grazing
41 It is not always only well-connected interests that profit from the federal
government's redistribution efforts. See Burkhard Bilger, Letter from Oregon,
The Mushroom Hunters, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 20, 2007, at 62 (explaining
that federal land managers in Oregon allow migrant workers and other low-
income people to collect highly valuable mushrooms for a nominal price).
48 Here the discussion focuses on the Interior Secretary (acting through the
BLM), but essentially the same mechanisms are available to the Agriculture
Secretary (acting through the USFS) on national forest lands.
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permits can be reversed nearly as easily as it is made.49
2. The Secretary can "withdraw" the federal lands from
livestock grazing under FLPMA. This entails somewhat
more paperwork and process, including submitting a formal
report to Congress. Withdrawals over five thousand acres
may not exceed twenty years in duration, and can be
revoked earlier, by a less cumbersome process than making
them in the first place.5 °
3. The Secretary can formally amend the applicable resource
management plan to provide that particular tracts shall not
be grazed. Paperwork and a public process are required
here as well. The plan may be amended at any time (using
the same process) to rescind the retirement.5'
49 The Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 provides for retiring
public land from livestock grazing either through FLPMA's land use planning
process or "where... the Secretary determines, and sets forth his reasons for this
determination, that grazing uses should be discontinued (either temporarily or
permanently) on certain lands." 43 U.S.C. § 1903(b) (2000). The Interior
Solicitor (full disclosure: one of the co-authors of this paper) issued an opinion
on January 19, 2001 that a decision to discontinue grazing need not be based on
any specific finding of harm, but instead requires only a determination that the
public lands should be devoted to other objectives like ecological restoration or
protection of wildlife habitat. The Bush (II) Administration's Solicitor (the
former Executive Director of the Public Lands Council, the principal public land
ranching trade association), subsequently issued two confusing opinions that,
while not overruling the January 2001 Opinion, sought to discourage retirements.
He warned that eliminating grazing can "disrupt the orderly use of the range,
breach the Secretary's duty to adequately safeguard grazing privileges, be
contrary to the protection, administration, regulation and improvement of public
lands within grazing districts, hamper the government's responsibility to account
for grazing receipts, [and] impede range improvements .... Memorandum,
Interior Solicitor, Solicitor Memorandum Opinion M-37008 (Oct. 4, 2002)
(clarified in May 2003) (on file with journal); see also supra note 42. A decision
to resume grazing after a period of retirement would presumably require
compliance with NEPA, but that procedural hoop is unlikely to be a significant
obstacle in a livestock-friendly Administration.
50 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 17020) (defining "withdrawal") & 1714 (explaining the
processes for and limitations on withdrawals). Withdrawals can be renewed for
up to twenty years at a time. Id., § 1714(c)(1); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e)
(requiring notice to Congress when a management decision "excludes (that is,
totally eliminates) one or more" principal uses of a tract of public land of one
hundred thousand acres or more). FLPMA does not subject a decision to revoke
a withdrawal to the same reporting requirements for making it in the first place.
It may require compliance with NEPA, but challenging revocation decisions in
court may not be easy. See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871
(1990).
51 FLPMA specifically acknowledges this method of grazing retirement by
giving an existing permittee first priority for renewal only "[s]o long as [among
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The market price a buyer pays for a federal grazing permit
reflects the reality that a buyer can expect to have that permit in
perpetuity. A conservation buyer would like the forage covered by
his permit to be used perpetually for something other than cows.
The law allows the federal land manager to refuse to retire the land
from livestock grazing, and even to return livestock to the land
later. This creates a grave risk that the conservation investor will
not get what it paid for.
52
A. Opposition to Buyouts
If a governmental decision to retire federal lands from grazing
were at little risk of reversal, the lack of legal permanence might
not be a serious impediment. But a political problem exacerbates
the legal one. Conservation buyouts of federal grazing permits can
trigger opposition and paralyze federal land managers. The most
noteworthy example occurred in the Grand Staircase Escalante
National Monument in southern Utah. The Grand Canyon Trust53
other things] the lands for which the permit or lease is issued remain available
for.., grazing in accordance with land use plans" prepared under FLPMA. 43
U.S.C. § 1752(c) (2006); see also Memorandum, Interior Solicitor, Solicitor
Memorandum Opinion IM 2001-079 (Jan. 19, 2001) (on file with author). If the
area being retired is within a "grazing district" established under the TGA, the
Secretary may also excise it from the district, with a finding that the area is not
"chiefly valuable" for grazing. Even if the lands are removed from a grazing
district, however, the TGA gives the Secretary discretion to lease them for
grazing. 43 U.S.C. § 315m (2000). Therefore, taking federal lands out of
grazing districts does not make it more difficult to reintroduce livestock to them.
52 The Clinton Administration sought to recognize conservation buyouts by a
different mechanism. Its "rangeland reform" regulations gave the Interior
Secretary authority to issue TGA grazing permits for "conservation use," which
meant the land covered by the permit would not be used by livestock for the
permit term (ordinarily, ten years). Although the provision allowed the Secretary
to issue "conservation use" permits only when the permittee requested it, the
ranchers', trade association challenged it, and a federal appellate court struck it
down, holding that the TGA did not authorize the issuance of permits not to
graze livestock. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287, 1308 (10th Cir.
1999); rev'd on other grounds, 529 U.S. 728 (2000). The decision precludes the
Secretary from halting grazing on lands covered by a TGA permit other than by
making annual determinations of how much, if any, use is appropriate.
Presumably, the Secretary could issue a conservation buyer a permit under
FLPMA (rather than the TGA), authorizing it to use the land formerly grazed for
wildlife habitat and ecological restoration, but this would not preclude a
Secretary from issuing a TGA permit -to a rancher to reintroduce cows on the
same land.
53 One of the co-authors is on the Board of the Trust and both are affiliated
with a foundation that provides funds to the Trust.
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purchased permits from willing-seller local ranchers, including a
county commissioner, and asked the BLM to amend the pertinent
land use plan to retire the land from grazing (at least for the
duration of the plan). The idea was supported by the local BLM
office. Initially, all political signs looked favorable. The local
Congressman, Chris Cannon, wrote Interior Secretary Gale Norton
to urge her "to support this worthwhile effort., 54 Norton, who had
advocated "free market" solutions earlier in her career when she
worked for the conservative, market-oriented Mountain States
Legal Foundation, responded that she "strongly endorsed this
action," because "this type of market-based solution can provide
an excellent opportunity for local groups to work together to
benefit the community and the land."55
It was not long, however, before a strong lobbying campaign
against retirement was mounted. According to Interior
Department sources who must remain confidential, the entire Utah
congressional delegation, including Congressman Cannon, came to
oppose the retirement, as did every single commissioner in the two
counties involved-including even the rancher-commissioner who
had sold his grazing permits to the Trust. The Secretary bowed to
the pressure and ordered BLM to postpone work on the plan
amendment. Six years later, the BLM has still not finished the
necessary paperwork to make a decision whether to retire the land
from grazing.
Such opposition is not unexpected. Neighboring ranchers
may oppose retirement because they may wish to use those
pastures to expand their own herds, or at least view them as
backup forage if their own allotments become unavailable because
of circumstances like drought. Opposition may. also come from
what economists call "third parties" in the community-interests
54 Letter from Chris Cannon, Member of Congress, to Gale A. Norton,
Secretary of the Interior, (Apr. 12, 2001).
55 Letter from Gale A. Norton, Secretary of the Interior, to Chris Cannon,
Member of Congress (Aug. 3, 2001) (on file with journal). Secretary Norton had
earlier supported the project in an April 23, 2001 letter to Terry Anderson, a
noted "free market environmentalist." Lynn Scarlett, then Interior's Assistant
Secretary of Policy, Budget, and Administration (and, as of this writing, Deputy
Secretary), who had also supported market solutions in her prior position at the
libertarian Reason Foundation, expressed similar sentiments. Letter from Lynn
Scarlett, Assistant Secretary of Policy, Management, and Budget, to Geoffrey
Barnard, President of the Grand Canyon Trust (Nov. 6, 2001) (on file with
journal).
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like the local bank, feed supplier, and farm and ranch implement
dealer. While the ranching industry and its suppliers have
dwindled to a relatively small part of the economic base of most
rural western communities, 56 they often continue to have great
sway over local politicians. For their part, ranchers' trade
associations like the Public Lands Council see retirements as
eroding their institutional and political power. Accordingly, they
favor allowing ranchers to sell permits only to other ranchers, even
though limiting the market this way probably leads to lower prices
for their rancher-members who want to sell.57 Finally, and perhaps
most important, there can be stout opposition based on ideology
and-culture. Rural western communities often strongly identify
themselves as ranching communities no matter howlittle ranching
contributes to the local economy, leading them to oppose any
movement to end livestock grazing on some federal lands.
The purchase-and-retirement strategy has worked in a few
places where special circumstances provide sufficient security that
the retirement will be permanent. Sometimes Congress itself has
provided the security, by specifically authorizing federal lands that
are being used for military or conservation purposes to be retired
from livestock grazing upon relinquishment of the grazing
permits.58 Grazing retirements have also occurred where the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), 59 a powerful federal regulatory
statute was involved because it furnished conservation purchasers
with considerable confidence that the retirement decision would be
difficult to undo. In national forests in the Greater Yellowstone
region of the northern Rockies, for example, conservationists
bought grazing permits from ranchers and persuaded the USFS to
amend management plans to retire about half a million acres from
grazing in order to eliminate conflicts with grizzly bears protected
under the ESA.60 Other federal laws may operate with similar
56 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
57 As mentioned in note 46, supra, currently only stock owners can buy
permits.
8 See 16 U.S.C. § 410mm-1(e)(2)(B) (2000) (establishing the Great Basin
National Park in Nevada); id. § 410aaa-50 (establishing the Mojave National
Park and Preserve in California); id. § 272b(b) (enlarging Arches National Park
in Utah); see also Central Idaho Economic Development and Recreation Act,
H.R. 222, 1 10th Cong. (2007).
59 16U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543.
60 See, e.g., Tom Kenworthy, Coalition "Retires" Grazing Area in Wyoming,USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 2003 at A4; Francisco Tharp, Yellowstone Grazing
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effect. On National Wildlife Refuges, livestock grazing is
generally permitted only where, "in the sound professional
judgment of the Director [of the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, it]
will not materially interfere with or detract from the fulfillment of
the mission of the National Wildlife Refuge System or the
purposes of the [individual] refuge."61 This can raise the bar
against resumption of grazing high enough to warrant investment
in conservation purchases.62
The situations where conservation purchases and retirements
have been achieved remain exceptional. There are more than two
hundred million acres of federal grazing lands where laws and
restrictions inspiring confidence that retirements will be permanent
do not exist. On these lands, the experience of the Grand Canyon
Trust-where locally-led opposition to grazing retirements and the
reluctance of the government to move forward in the face of it-
has chilled the ardor of conservation interests in making such
buyouts, reduced competition for ranch purchases, dampening the
prospects of ranchers who would like to sell out, and perpetuated
environmental degradation.
B. The Solution
The solution we proffer is a statute (see Appendix A) that
directs the responsible federal agency to retire federal land from
grazing permanently if the holder of the federal permit requests
it.63 In one simple stroke it would remove the two major obstacles
to conservation investments in grazing buyouts: It would be
essentially permanent (the statute would deny the agency authority
to reintroduce livestock on the public land once removed) and,
being automatic, could not be stopped by local opposition. It
would work only for full-fledged retirements, and not merely for
reductions in the number of livestock grazing in a particular area.
The government's regulatory authority would remain available to
reduce (and, if appropriate, eliminate) livestock grazing where
Allotments, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Mar. 24, 2008, available at
http://www.hcn.org/articles/17600.61 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(1).
62 This occurred in the Hart Mountain National Wildlife Refuge. See
MICHAEL BEAN & MELANIE ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE
LAW 297-98 (Praeger 1997) (1983); Wilderness Society v. Babbitt, 5 F.3d 383
(9th Cir. 1993).
63 See Appendix A, infra.
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advisable. 64
Our solution would bring more private philanthropic capital to
bear, because conservation buyers would have assurance they
would get what they are paying for-no more livestock grazing.
Of course, Congress retains the authority to enact legislation
opening particular tracts of retired land back up to livestock
grazing. But this has never occurred to our knowledge, and thus
we are confident our proposed statute provides sufficient real-
world certainty to motivate many conservation investors.65
Beyond providing permanence, our proposed generic
legislation insulates specific retirement decisions from local
politics once a rancher decides to sell to a conservation buyer. By
enacting our proposed statute, Congress would be making a
national policy decision for the lands managed by the BLM and
U.S. Forest Service. This is appropriate because, so long as the
lands are owned by the whole nation, the ultimate test is what best
serves the national interest. We hasten to add that the statute
would not operate unless the owner of the grazing permit decided
to sell the permit to the conservation buyer. Opponents of grazing
retirement remain free either to outbid the conservation buyer or to
persuade the rancher not to sell. But our proposal would not allow
opponents to use local political pressure to override the decision,
64 Congress might at the same time consider legislation replicating the tax
deductibility of conservation easements. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(E) (2000). This
would allow ranchers who relinquish their permits back to the government to
deduct the market value of those permits. Because ranchers have no property
interest in their grazing permits, taking such a step would significantly extend the
concept of tax deductibility, and for that reason ought to be carefully considered.
If Congress were to move in this direction, we would recommend, in order to
maximize conservation value and minimize the possibility of abuse, making the
deduction available only if entire pastures were completely and permanently
retired.
61 Some have contended that this degree of permanence in land use decisions
is unwise because we cannot know what land uses will be sensible decades down
the road. See generally Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and
the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REv. 739 (2002). Others have proposed
various ways to mitigate that concern. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson Jr., The
Trouble with Time: Influencing the Conservation Choices of Future Generations,
44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601 (2004); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the
Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421
(2005). The concern has not prevented Congress from deciding to allow tax
deductions only for "perpetual" conservation easements. See I.R.C. §
170(h)(5)(A) (2006); 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(a) (2007). Should circumstances
change dramatically, Congress could reverse course and open retired federal
lands back up to livestock grazing, though that would seem unlikely.
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once the rancher and the conservation buyer strike a deal.
C. Criteria for Hybrid Market/Regulatory Solutions
Those who oppose "buying" conservation in a regulated
environment make a number of credible arguments. Some argue
that ranchers should not be paid to stop doing something they have
no right to do; in effect, they should not be paid to comply with
environmental laws and regulations.66 The opposition to paying is
both principled and practical. The principled argument is that
ranchers should not be allowed to profit further from their use of a
resource owned by all Americans, a resource they have already
overused at public expense. The practical concern is that, if the
political system gets into the habit of buying greater protection for
the public interest, it will lose its capacity to regulate to achieve
the same end. "If one owner gets paid by a land trust to avoid
unwanted development, then how is it legitimate for government to
prohibit another landowner from doing the same without
payment?,
67
We generally agree that buying conservation is bad public
policy in circumstances where it significantly undermines
68 tiregulation, or when it is an inefficient or ineffective use of public
resources, such as when it costs much for only temporary change
or marginal benefits. In our view, the key to successfully mixing
the market and regulatory approaches is to do it in such a way as to
address these valid concerns. We believe that the solution we
advocate here-using private, albeit tax-subsidized 69 funds to
66 See John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying Land Owners to
Protect the Environment, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 39-40 (2005).
67 ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND
ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 80 (2007); see also Holly Doremus, Shaping the
Future: The Dialectic of Law and Environmental Values, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
233,238 (2003).
68 See Echeverria, supra note 66, at 39-40 and accompanying text.
69 The tax subsidy occurs either through the tax deduction given a donor to
one of the tax exempt conservation organizations purchasing the permit, or
where the rancher takes a tax deduction when she donates her permit (if such a
deduction is allowed, see footnote 67 and accomanying text, supra). Although
our proposal is aimed at privately-funded (albeit tax-subsidized) conservation
purchases, there is no reason it could not be applied to buyouts achieved by more
direct application of public funds. Such buyouts have occurred where the ESA
and other special circumstances foster confidence that retirements will be
permanent. In Clark County, Nevada, public land grazing permits were
purchased and retired with public and private funds in order to create a habitat
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permanently retire federal grazing permits-minimizes these
pitfalls while bringing many benefits of the market to bear on the
problem.
First, we believe our proposal is unlikely to undermine
existing regulation. Decades of mostly unsuccessful
conservationist advocacy and litigation for tougher regulation
make it clear that while numbers of livestock may be reduced, and
even eliminated for a while, many degraded federal lands will
never be permanently retired from grazing by regulation alone.
Federal land managers have almost never used the regulatory tool
to eliminate livestock grazing even when the health of the land
plainly requires it.70  Against this historical record, we do not
believe our proposal would undermine the government's appetite
for regulation any more than an easement purchased to forestall
development on a particular piece of land undermines the
government's appetite to regulate building size and location
throughout the neighborhood. Specifically, we do not expect
federal land managers to alter whatever level of effort they are
making toward achieving ecological health on public rangelands
simply because a method has been created to facilitate retiring
some federal land from grazing altogether. We also think that
continuing federal regulation will minimize the possibility of
"greenmailing" by those ranchers who might be tempted to put
excess numbers of livestock on their federal allotments to motivate
conservation interests to buy them out.
Buying grazing permits to remove livestock from tracts of
federal lands would not work to recognize a new property right for
ranchers. For many decades federal grazing permits have been
bought and sold in the private market, with private funds, without
undermining the federal policy, clearly expressed in federal law,
that the grazing permit carries with it no property interest to
federal land. Ranchers have kept up a steady stream of litigation
seeking to gain property rights in federal lands comparable to those
of miners and some others, but the courts have consistently ruled
conservation plan for the desert tortoise, a species subject to the ESA's
protection, in order to allow more development elsewhere. CLARK COUNTY, NV,
DESERT TORTOISE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN, (1991). In Idaho, with the
support of the local Indian Tribe and the state Department of Game and Fish, the
Bonneville Power Administration used fish restoration funds to buy and retire
grazing permits on national forest land that was prime habitat for several
endangered fish.
70 See supra note 44.
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against them.71 It is hard to imagine that enactment of our
proposed federal statute would transform the legal landscape in
this area.
Our solution also minimizes the problem of using tax-
subsidized funds to secure only marginal or temporary
conservation. If past experience is an indicator, those
philanthropic organizations most likely to fund conservation-
oriented grazing buyouts will have access to good, site-specific
information about the conservation benefits that might be
generated from retirements; indeed, their information is often
better than the government's (the . BLM's in particular).
Furthermore, with limited funds, these organizations have an
incentive to ensure they are purchasing the permits most in need of
retirement. Also, as noted earlier, the government has some ability
to move grazing around by adjusting different ranchers' grazing
patterns in order to retire the most damaged lands in the area.
72
Another objection to our proposed solution is that it allows
conservation buyers to turn what is at least nominally a public
decision-whether particular tracts of federal lands are to be
grazed by domestic livestock-into a private decision. That is,
under our proposal if a conservation buyer like The Nature
Conservancy decides there should be no grazing on a tract of
federal land, and the rancher with the grazing permit is willing to
sell to TNC, the federal land will not be grazed. This is the case
regardless whether the federal land managing agency, the
71 Most recently, federal and state courts have rejected ranchers' claims that
the water rights they perfect under state law in association with their federal land
grazing permits carry with them any sort of right, compensable or otherwise, to
graze federal land. See Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 466 F.3d 803, 807
(9th Cir. 2006); Walker v. United States, 162 P.3d 882, 884 (N.M. 2007).
72 See supra text accompanying note 48. We have noted the possibility of
giving ranchers who donate their permits a tax deduction comparable to that
obtained by donating a conservation easement. See supra note 64. Critics have
pointed out the inefficient character of conservation easements-their
conservation benefits may not approach their cost to the public treasury because
in many situations those donating or selling the easement have no intention of
developing anything for the foreseeable future, and those on the verge of
development are unlikely to donate or sell an easement no matter how much
conservation benefit would result. See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 66, at 21-22.
We do not believe that is much of a problem in the federal land grazing context.
Ranchers may be mostly likely to donate and retire permits to graze those federal
lands which are most expensive to manage, and which produce the least profit,
and we believe that in many cases those lands are likely to be the ones suffering
the most ecologically.
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surrounding landowners or the local communities agree. The
concern here echoes a criticism sometimes leveled at conservation
easements, that the public treasury is putting up the money
(through the tax deduction) but the "choice about what land to
protect is, for all intents and purposes, delegated to private
owners.73
We do not find this argument persuasive in this context. For
one thing, to the extent the proposal contemplates the use of tax-
subsidized dollars to fund grazing retirements,' the decision to
retire the land is a public decision, not a private one-albeit a
generic policy decision made by the U.S. Congress, rather than a
site-specific decision by an official in the executive branch.
Second, even when the decision about which particular federal
lands will be retired is a private one (made by the rancher-seller
and private conservation buyer), the result is a typical feature of
tax policy. The generic tax subsidy for charitable activities leaves
the question of how the subsidy is used, and whether it is used
wisely, largely beyond public oversight except at the grossest
level. 4
Finally, it is entirely consistent with the historical evolution of
federal land policy for Congress to decide federal grazing
retirement policy generically, rather than to leave it to the
executive branch through tract-by-tract decisions. For much of the
nation's history, until around the turn of the twentieth century,
private interests directly dictated what happened to federal lands.75
Private livestock herders decided by their actions, without any
sanction by Congress, that much of the federal lands would be
grazed by domestic livestock. In that same earlier era, Congress
gave homesteaders and other settlers, miners, railroads and others
free rein to choose federal lands to pursue their missions because
Congress decided settling and developing these lands was in the
national interest.
Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress gradually
changed policy. One change was to supplant private decision-
making by enlarging the authority and discretion of the executive
branch to decide how federal lands would be used. (But even in so
73 Echeverria, supra note 66, at 8.
74 Of course, to the extent public funds are used directly for grazing buyouts.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text. This problem of the private character
of the retirement decision would attenuate.
75 See Blumm, supra note 42.
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doing, Congress left wide running room for private decisions about
federal land use, for federal minerals are not developed nor federal
trees harvested nor federal grass grazed by livestock unless private
industry is willing to undertake the job.) Another change, even
more pertinent to the present context, was that Congress
increasingly decided for itself to favor one kind of land use and
management over another. These generic congressional decisions
were made principally in the direction of conservation, as
exemplified by the trend, still underway, to put more and more
tracts of federal lands in the national park and wilderness and other
conservation systems.
The solution we propose is entirely consistent with both the
long history of Congress making generic national decisions
implemented locally through private decision-making, and the
seemingly inexorable trend of congressional decisions promoting
conservation on federal lands.
CONCLUSION
Adopting the simple statutory solution we propose offers- the
opportunity to restore environmental health to millions of acres of
land, and to reduce continuing conflict between ranchers and
conservation interests. It might also work in some other contexts
to stop overexploitation and promote conservation of natural
resources. As we see it, the following are some of the key features
of this hybrid between regulation and private markets.
1. The hybrid solution is necessarily ad hoc, tailored to fit the
specific factual and regulatory context and crafted to
address the exact problem.
2. It creates no new private rights in public resources. Instead,
it makes relatively small changes in the regulatory
framework in order to permit private solutions to
complement the regulatory regime, to provide both
efficiency and distributional benefits. The continued
enforcement of the regulatory regime remains an essential
element of the hybrid solution.
3. It involves a market-setting mechanism-a new law-
aimed at creating some legal certainty to furnish a
conservation purchaser strong assurance that it will receive
the conservation values it seeks.-
4. It is aimed at achieving an objective that a long history has
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persuasively shown is unattainable by regulation alone.
This approach may make it easier to protect conservation
values on areas of federal land where private rights exist. A
number of areas of federal land with high conservation values, and
considerable public support for protecting these values, are subject
to existing mineral leases, timber sale contracts and the like.
Conservation-oriented dollars may be available to buy up those
leases or contracts from willing sellers (who may not want the
controversy of trying to develop the area by exercising their rights)
and relinquish them back to the government. But, as with
livestock grazing permits, this is often risky because federal land
managers retain the authority to issue new leases or timber sale
contracts. A solution comparable to what we offer here for
livestock grazing is for Congress to legislate to protect the
conservation values of the area, withdrawing it from new leasing,
timber sales, and the like, while protecting valid existing rights.
This creates a framework of permanence that would allow
conservation dollars to be used to buy the outstanding private
rights from willing sellers. Such a solution was adopted by
Congress in 2006 in the Rocky Mountain Front of Montana,76 and
is currently before Congress in the Wyoming Range Legacy Act of
2007 introduced by Wyoming Senator John Barrassso.77
Another context where a similar approach is being taken is in
the ocean off Big Sur, California, where an upwelling of water
from the ocean floor disseminates huge amounts of nutrients,
producing coral gardens seven feet tall, whole communities of rare
species, and some of the world's biggest rockfish. Weighted nets
dragged along the ocean floor by trawlers were causing heavy
damage, but attempts at regulation had done little to stem it. Early
in the new millennium, the Environmental Defense Fund and The
Nature Conservancy bought fishing permits from trawlers as part
of a package that included the trawlers and the conservationists
persuading the federal regulators (the Pacific Fisheries
Management Council and NOAA Fisheries) to create several "no-
trawl" zones totaling more than three million acres of ocean
bottom. Under current law, the zone is not permanent, but the
conservationists have purchased all the trawler permits being
76 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub.L. 109-432, § 403, 120 Stat.
2922, 3050-53 (2006).
77 S. 2229, 10 9th Cong. § 1 (2007).
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operated out of Morro Bay, California (and have options to
purchase most of the remaining central coast trawl permits), which
reduces the likelihood that significant pressure will be brought to
bear to reopen the area to trawling. Part of the motivation on the
part of the fishing industry was that, like ranching, it was
becoming more economically marginal. Like ranchers,
commercial fishers have no property rights in their permits, but,
like ranchers, they have a deep culture and long-held expectations
that they could continue to fish. Moreover, as in the grazing
context, federal regulation had not been able to address the
problem satisfactorily.78 Buying out fishing licenses or quotas to
reduce overfishing may be possible elsewhere.79
78 Personal communication with Rod Fujita, Staff Expert, Environmental
Defense Fund (May 2, 2008).
79 A key is having the ability to effectively halt fishing in the area in question
as part of a buyout package. In June 2006, President Bush proclaimed the
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Marine National Monument and authorized the
permanent retirement of fishing licenses in the area if they were offered back to
the government. The Pew Charitable Trusts then opened negotiations to buy out
the fishing licenses, if all eight of the existing fishing permit.holders agreed to
sell, if the compensation were based on fair market value as determined by catch
history and fishing income, and if the federal government agreed to retire the
fishing permits permanently, and not reissue new ones. See Press Release, The
Pew Charitable Trusts, Pew Charitable Trusts Opens Formal Discussions with
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Fisherman (July 25, 2006), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/news roomdetail.aspx?id= 19740. Pew eventually
abandoned its efforts after only two of the permit holders showed interest. See
Jan TenBruggencate, Pew Trust Gives Up On Fishermen Buyouts, THE
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Nov. 3, 2006, at 5B.
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APPENDIX A
Proposed regulatory language:
"Whenever the holder of a permit to graze livestock on a specific
tract of federal land, for the express purpose of retiring that federal
land from all livestock grazing in order to further the conservation
of public resources, makes an irrevocable offer, in writing, to
relinquish the permit to the federal agency responsible for
managing that land, the federal agency shall forthwith withdraw
that tract of federal land from grazing, and make conforming
changes in the pertinent resource management plan. The
withdrawal shall be effective, and the changes in the plan
completed, within sixty days of receipt of the request, and shall
remain in effect until the Congress provides otherwise."
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